

RESTRICTED

FM 30-5

WAR DEPARTMENT

BASIC FIELD MANUAL



**MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE**

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Prepared under direction of the

Chief of Staff



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BASIC FIELD MANUAL**MILITARY INTELLIGENCE****COMBAT INTELLIGENCE**

(The matter contained herein supersedes Part One, Basic Field Manual, Volume X, July 15, 1938.)

SECTION I**GENERAL**

■ 1. **SCOPE.**—*a.* This manual sets forth the fundamental considerations relative to military intelligence in the theater of operations and is prescribed as a guide in the organization, training, and employment of intelligence personnel of all combat units.

b. This manual is based on fundamental doctrines contained in Field Service Regulations. Special methods and details peculiar to the various arms which are not covered herein are prescribed in their respective Field Manuals.

c. More detailed information with reference to specialized activities relating to combat intelligence is contained in FM 30-10, FM 30-15, FM 30-20, FM 30-21, and FM 30-25.

■ 2. **INFORMATION.**—All documents, facts, or observations of any kind which may serve to throw light on the enemy or the theater of operations constitute information. No information should be neglected. Information which seems unimportant at first glance may, on being compared with that already received, assume primary importance. The value of information is increased when the circumstances concerning its origin, including the time at which it was obtained, are known.

■ 3. **MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.**—Military intelligence is evaluated and interpreted information concerning a possible or actual enemy, or theater of operations, together with the conclusions drawn therefrom. It includes information concerning enemy capabilities or possible lines of action open to him, as well as all that relates to the territory controlled

by him or subject to his influence. Based upon its source, military intelligence is divided into two general classes; combat intelligence and War Department intelligence.

a. Combat intelligence.—Combat intelligence is the military intelligence produced in the field, after the outbreak of hostilities, by the military intelligence section of GHQ and military intelligence sections of all subordinate units. Usually this class of intelligence is confined to the terrain and to location, strength, composition, dispositions, movements, armament, equipment, supply, tactics, training, discipline, and morale of the enemy forces opposing a combat unit and the deductions made from a consideration of these factors. In the army and higher organizations, it includes the broader aspects of military intelligence of particular importance in strategical decisions.

b. War Department intelligence.—(1) War Department intelligence is the military intelligence produced under the direction of the War Department General Staff in peace and in war. Every country and possible theater of operations is studied. These studies include composition, distribution, fighting quality, organization, armament, equipment, and tactical and supply methods of the armed forces; the personality of high commanders; resources in manpower and material, and the period of time required to convert these to military use; economic and political conditions and aspirations; history and national psychology; and military geography, topography, and climatic conditions. This intelligence furnishes the basis for projected operations and for changes in organization, training, armament, equipment, and supplies to meet the tactical methods of a particular enemy, possible or actual.

(2) The Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff is responsible for keeping this intelligence up to date and for issuing necessary maps, monographs, and reports to the field forces whenever required by them.

(3) The chiefs of arms and services are responsible for maintaining an up-to-date compilation of information on the various foreign armies concerning their respective arms or services in such condition that it can be reproduced and distributed upon short notice.

■ 4. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN COMMANDER'S DECISION.—*a.* The commander's decision is based upon the mission as affected by the following:

- (1) Enemy to be dealt with in accomplishing the mission.
- (2) Terrain over which the operation must be conducted.
- (3) Means available for the execution of the mission.

b. Before making a decision initiating action designed to accomplish his mission, the commander will need information concerning the two unknown factors, enemy and terrain; having made a decision, he will require information which will permit him to continue projected operations and accomplish his mission regardless of what the enemy may do, or to make a new decision in view of the changed situation. Military intelligence thus plays a direct part in every decision, the soundness of which will depend in each case upon the accuracy of information regarding the two unknown factors and upon the ability of the commander to understand correctly the influence of the various factors upon the problem. Consequently, for each decision of the commander there should be, whenever appropriate, an intelligence plan designed to coordinate the search for definite information which the particular situation demands.

■ 5. OBJECT OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE.—*a.* The primary object of combat intelligence work is to reduce as far as possible uncertainties regarding the enemy and local conditions and thus assist the commander in making a decision and the troops in executing their assigned missions.

b. The secondary object of combat intelligence work is to assist the commander in the formulation and supervision of counterintelligence measures designed to conceal our own intentions and activities and to defeat measures adopted by the enemy for the purpose of influencing our own actions.

■ 6. DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN OBTAINING ADEQUATE INFORMATION.—The difficulties involved in obtaining adequate information and in arriving at reliable conclusions based thereon are many. These difficulties are due principally to the fact that the interests of the enemy demand that he shall make every possible effort to foil our attempts to gain information.

He will conceal his movements by night marches and counter-intelligence measures involving the use of both ground and air agencies; he will make use of ground and cover to conceal his movements and will supplement natural cover with camouflage; he will resort to any tactical measures that offer a reasonable chance of obtaining secrecy or surprise; he will enforce a strict censorship and enforce cryptographic security measures to prevent leaks of information; he may distribute false information and institute measures to deceive our collecting agencies; and he will sometimes adopt a course of action that may appear illogical. The opposition of the enemy's interest to our own, as well as the independence of his will, must necessarily make him more or less an unknown factor in every situation. To a lesser degree, the terrain also is an unknown factor.

SECTION II

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION

■ 7. UNIT COMMANDER.—Since intelligence constitutes a vital element in the commander's estimate of the situation leading to a decision, it is a basic function of command to initiate and coordinate the search for the necessary information. In addition, a commander may receive reconnaissance missions or demands for specific information from higher authority as well as requests for information from lower and neighboring units. These may or may not coincide with his own requirements for information. In any case, each commander is responsible for obtaining all military information which is essential to his own unit, whether by his own means or by requests on higher or neighboring headquarters. Conversely, within his own zone of operations he is responsible for collecting such information as is requested by higher headquarters, and so far as practicable, such as is requested by lower and neighboring units. By this system a commander, with due regard to the mobility of any forces that the enemy may possibly possess, particularly mechanized and motorized, is enabled to extend his search for information in sufficient depth and width to guard against surprise.

■ 8. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2.—*Wherever the term “assistant chief of staff, G-2” or “G-2” is used in this manual it is interpreted to include the intelligence officer or S-2 of all lower units.*

a. At the headquarters of every combat unit, the G-2 will keep the commander and all interested staff officers informed regarding the enemy situation and of his deductions concerning it.

b. Under the supervision and direction of the chief of staff or unit commander, it will be the duty of G-2 to—

(1) Specify the information to be gathered.

(2) Initiate a systematic and coordinated search for required information by all available collecting agencies.

(3) Collate, evaluate, and interpret information derived from all possible sources.

(4) Reduce intelligence to a systematic form and distribute it to all concerned in time to be of value to the recipients.

(5) Insure that intelligence is given due consideration in the preparation of plans, and that orders, formal or fragmentary, are checked to see that this has been done.

(6) Insure that counterintelligence measures are given due consideration in the preparation of plans, and that orders, formal or fragmentary, are checked to see that this has been done.

(7) Supervise mapping activities and assure an adequate supply and distribution of maps and map substitutes.

(8) Coordinate requests for aerial photographs and in some echelons determine their distribution.

(9) Maintain close liaison with the G-2 section of higher, lower, and adjacent units.

(10) Exercise general supervision over all intelligence activities and, whenever directed by the commanding officer, intelligence training in the unit.

■ 9. DUAL FUNCTIONS.—The military intelligence section is one of the coordinate sections of every general staff and of similarly organized staffs. It has operative functions as well as general staff functions which vary in scope with the size of the command. In the lower units, the operative functions may be confined to observation and the examination of prisoners and documents, while at GHQ they include pub-

licity, counterpropaganda, censorship, control of visitors, counterespionage, espionage, and others.

■ 10. PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION.—*a.* The intelligence section should be able to handle information of a scope commensurate with the size and mission of the command. It should be so organized and equipped that it will fit into the living and working conditions of the command in all situations while retaining the degree of mobility essential to the arm; and its organization should facilitate the collection, collation, evaluation, and interpretation of information as well as prompt dissemination of the resulting intelligence to all concerned.

b. In the division and lower combat units, the primary functions of the intelligence section are the collection, collation, evaluation, and interpretation of information, and dissemination of combat intelligence. The organization should be simple; methods employed should insure speed; and facilities available at headquarters should be appropriate to the unit and the arm concerned. Complete details of operation are contained in the Field Manuals for the respective arms.

SECTION III

COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

■ 11. COORDINATION.—Ability of the enemy to act in various ways within his assigned mission and the limited and diverse nature of information gathering agencies available to the commander require an understanding of enemy capabilities and the most careful coordination of all intelligence activities.

a. Enemy capabilities.—(1) In any situation, the lines of action of which the enemy is physically capable and which can possibly affect the accomplishment or manner of execution of our mission are called the enemy capabilities for that particular situation. The term “capabilities” includes not only the general lines of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular lines of action possible under each general line of action. For example, under the general line of action of an attack, the various particular lines of action possible are an attack

today, an attack tomorrow, an envelopment of our left flank, an uncoordinated attack against our front, and others.

(2) In order that the commander may arrive at a new decision or decide to adhere to an old one, he must, from time to time, make an estimate of the situation. As an essential part of such an estimate, he must obtain, ordinarily from G-2, factual data as to the combat strength of the enemy confronting him and as to the possible strength and time of arrival of reinforcements. In addition, the commander with the assistance of G-2 must arrive at conclusions relative to the enemy's capabilities and the effect of time, space, terrain, and other conditions upon each of these.

(3) The commander's initial decision, however, must be supplemented by other decisions as the action progresses. These decisions must be based on a narrowing down of the enemy capabilities previously considered. Accordingly, intelligence activities should be so directed as to investigate each capability with a view to finally determining which of his capabilities the enemy is actually adopting. This can be accomplished only by obtaining information which gradually eliminates certain capabilities and eventually enables G-2 to determine the line of action the enemy has adopted. If this process is based upon faulty interpretation or upon inadequate or inaccurate information, there is always danger that the enemy may gain surprise.

b. Essential elements of information.—(1) The essential elements of information consist of that information of the enemy, of the terrain not under our control, or of meteorological conditions in territory held by the enemy which a commander needs to make a sound decision, conduct a maneuver, avoid surprise, or formulate details of a plan of operations. The essential elements are designated for the purpose of focusing the attention and activities of all collecting agencies on that information which, from the viewpoint of the commander, is necessary at a particular time. They include questions relating to enemy capabilities, other intelligence specifically desired by the commander, and information requested by other units.

(2) It is the duty of the commander to obtain correct information bearing upon his mission and to insure coordi-

nation of all collecting agencies at his disposal. He is therefore responsible for the designation of essential elements of information. He makes basic decisions and exercises the continuing supervision which insure that the intelligence effort is directed along proper lines. In determining essential elements, however, he is assisted by his chief of staff and G-2. G-2 should study continuously in collaboration with other members of the staff, particularly G-3, our own and the enemy situation, possible lines of action open to the enemy, and the influence of terrain and other local conditions on these lines of action. Based on this study, G-2 should at all times be prepared to recommend to the commander the essential elements of information and to give the important considerations governing their selection.

NOTE.—Wherever the term "G-3" is used in this manual it is interpreted to include the S-3 of all lower combat units.

(3) As a standing procedure and without a special directive, the following will be considered as essential elements in appropriate situations:

(a) In an advance by the enemy, the number, strength, composition, and direction of movement of columns and probable place of contact.

(b) In an attack by the enemy, the direction and weight of the main effort.

(c) In a defense by the enemy, the flanks, and strength, composition, and location of reserves capable of intervening.

(d) In an enemy retrograde movement, the direction of movement and location of demolitions and defensive positions.

(e) In a pursuit by the enemy, the strength, composition, location, and direction of movement of encircling forces and where they will make contact.

(f) In projected operations, the nature, location, and condition of natural and man-made obstacles to our maneuver and the determination of important terrain features not shown on available maps.

(4) For purposes of orientation, either the commander in his directive or G-2 should acquaint the staff with the essential elements and with any modifications of them. If an intelligence annex is issued, the essential elements are stated

therein. If no annex is issued, they are communicated to subordinate commanders if practicable.

(5) Essential elements may be expressed in the form of a question or in the form of a statement as to information desired. If expressed as a question, it should be understood that no guess as to enemy intentions is desired, but that search is to be directed for facts which will disclose, progressively, the confirmation or elimination of the capability to which the inquiry relates.

■ 12. INFORMATION NOT LIMITED TO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS.—The essential elements of information are guides governing the search for information and not limitations regulating the information to be reported. Therefore, collecting agencies will transmit all enemy information which comes to their attention.

■ 13. NATURE OF INFORMATION REQUIRED.—In order to determine the type of information required to answer the essential elements of information, G-2 must understand the object and scope of the study and the sources and significance of information. The following are some of the considerations he should take into account:

a. Study of terrain.—(1) *Sources of information.*—The sources of information for a study of the terrain are maps; vertical and oblique aerial photographs; personal reconnaissance, when possible; troops, particularly Cavalry and Air Corps; inhabitants and agents; enemy documents; and geographical reports from higher headquarters.

(2) *Responsibility.*—G-2 is responsible for the study of the terrain from the point of view of the enemy, and the collection of information as to the terrain and meteorological conditions in territory held by the enemy.

(3) *Estimate of terrain held by us from viewpoint of enemy.*—(a) Based upon his knowledge of the enemy situation and of the enemy's probable knowledge of our own situation, G-2 should determine the favorable and unfavorable effects of the terrain on all possible lines of action which may be adopted by the enemy.

(b) For operations of the corps and lower units, the estimate is prepared after a detailed study of relief, natural and

artificial obstacles, communication, and cover. If time permits, preparation of the estimate may be facilitated by special maps upon which stream lines and ridge lines have been plainly marked.

(c) In the higher echelons of command, G-2 should give careful consideration to the influence of economic resources, natural and artificial obstacles, and communication of territory under our control upon possible plans open to the enemy.

(4) *Terrain not under our control.*—(a) A study of terrain not under our control should include such matters as are directly necessitated by the essential elements of information, if any, relating to the terrain. In addition, G-2 should ascertain from G-3 whether any features should be investigated with respect to their effect on details of our contemplated maneuver. This is particularly important with respect to obstacles to our maneuver whose present condition is not disclosed by available maps.

(b) In the higher echelons of command, economic resources, natural and artificial obstacles, and communication within the enemy's territory will be subjects of special studies by G-2.

(5) *Meteorological conditions.*—Although meteorological conditions do not constitute a part of a terrain study, nevertheless they have such an immediate and important relation to terrain that they should be included in the study.

b. Study of the enemy.—(1) *Importance.*—The enemy represents the most uncertain factor. No matter how painstakingly information may be sought, it is difficult to obtain and when obtained is frequently too old to be of use. The continuous increase in mobility of fire and speed of movement reduces the time during which any given information is of value. Improvement in means of collecting information has not compensated for this shortening of time. The intelligence officer must therefore exercise a continuous supervision and coordination over the search for additional information.

(2) *Information desired.*—The information desired varies with the size of the unit and with the development of the

situation during operations. Depending upon the situation, the following factors are of varying importance:

(a) *Distance between opposing forces.*—The distance between opposing forces and the local conditions will show with what elements the enemy can engage and will indicate in a general way the line of contact under various lines of action which he may adopt.

(b) *Enemy activities.*—The enemy's ground and air activities, including movements of combat elements and of service elements and supplies, entrenching, fire, and radio and other communication, furnish information bearing on the enemy's capabilities. Information as to movements should include strength, composition, direction, and location of heads of columns at a specified time.

(c) *Enemy dispositions.*—Information of the location and strength of the hostile position and the dispositions thereon furnishes, either directly or indirectly, indications as to enemy capabilities. The locations of the mass of reserves and of the mass of field artillery are usually of particular importance. Other items may include the location, number, and strength of front line units; deployment of field artillery in width and depth; strength and type of field artillery; location of cavalry forces; location and capacity of airdromes; enemy aviation activity over the area; location and strength of mechanized units; location, amount, and activity of anti-aircraft artillery; enemy radio activity; enemy reserves with position, strength, and composition, and the time required to enter action; the distant reinforcements capable of intervening, with strength and composition; and the enemy logistical arrangements with location of installations, important supply centers, and sensitive points on the lines of communication.

(d) *Means available to the enemy.*

1. *Manpower.*—A study of the enemy order of battle, by which is meant a study of enemy manpower, location, strength, composition, training, and morale of all enemy troop units, both in line and in reserve, and the ability and character of the enemy commanders, will facilitate an understand-

ing of the enemy's capabilities. This study will be initiated by GHQ at the outbreak of hostilities.

2. *Matériel and supply*.—Knowledge of the type, condition, capacity, and quantity of matériel available to the enemy, particularly of weapons and of transportation, and the adequacy or inadequacy of his supply, especially of munitions, will similarly facilitate an estimate of the enemy's capabilities. The presence of bridging materials may have an important and direct bearing on these capabilities in some situations.

(e) *Enemy defensive measures*.—Defensive measures of the enemy furnish important evidence of his present attitude and of his capabilities to persist therein or to change to some other line of action. He may supplement natural obstacles with prepared obstacles intended to deny or obstruct our maneuver or to facilitate his own. The following items should be investigated:

1. *Organization of the ground*.—Successive lines of defense, supporting positions and communication, depth of the defensive position, and echelonment of positions.

2. *Strength of organization*.—Organized field works, their type and degree of completion; wire entanglements, shelters, gun emplacements, observation posts, command posts, and communication; and antitank and antiaircraft defensive measures.

3. *Demolitions*.—Location, extent, and nature of all demolitions on roads, bridges, and railways.

4. *Inundations*.—Location of flooded areas or of areas that may be flooded.

5. *Gas*.—Location and extent of areas contaminated with gas, including the nature of the contaminating agent.

(f) Other items of information may be required in particular situations.

■ 14. COLLECTING AGENCIES.—a. Collecting agencies available to a combat unit vary with its size, facilities, and distance from the front. The battalion is the smallest unit provided with intelligence personnel. It collects its information

mainly by means of patrols, scouts, observation posts, reports of front line companies, and the hasty examination of prisoners of war, enemy deserters, inhabitants, and documents. At the other extreme is the army or GHQ, which has at its disposal such facilities as aviation for visual and photographic reconnaissance, radio interception, radio goniometry, secret agents, and sound and flash ranging. The organic collecting agencies of each combat unit are prescribed by appropriate Tables of Organization. Additional collecting agencies may be attached to units which are operating alone.

b. Information collecting agencies available in a combat unit may include part or all of the following:

(1) *Military intelligence personnel.*—This personnel, directly under the orders of the intelligence officer, is assigned to units for the sole duty of conducting intelligence activities which may include—

(a) *Installation and operation of an observation service.*—In addition to ground observation maintained by troop units themselves, intelligence personnel may establish and maintain supplemental observation of the enemy within the zone of action of the unit.

(b) *Mission of intelligence scouts.*—The sole mission of intelligence scouts, either when operating alone or in conjunction with reconnaissance patrols or raiding parties, is to gather information. They engage in combat only in furtherance of this mission.

(c) *Examination of prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, and inhabitants.*—Proper examination of prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, and inhabitants furnishes valuable and accurate information concerning the enemy order of battle, organization, dispositions, plans and preparations, morale, and numerous other subjects. Specially trained interpreters of the intelligence service conduct the examination.

(d) *Examination of captured documents.*—This study furnishes valuable information relative to the enemy order of battle, troop movements, economic conditions, tactical doctrine, morale, and other subjects. Systematic examination of captured documents of both a personal and official nature is a function of specially trained intelligence personnel. At times they may be assisted by Signal Corps specialists in cryptography.

(e) *Examination of captured matériel.*—Examination of captured matériel by qualified experts enables our forces to keep an accurate check on new developments and eventually leads to the adoption of new technique, tactical doctrine, or matériel to meet these developments.

(f) *Liaison.*—Close liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent units by means of special agents, particularly during battle, facilitates the rapid transmittal of information vital to the commander concerned. Units which have Air Corps organizations assigned or attached for reconnaissance or observation will establish branch intelligence offices with these organizations for the purpose of facilitating the flow of information. The liaison officer in charge will keep constantly informed of the enemy situation and of the essential elements of information by means of close and frequent contact with the G-2 section of higher headquarters. Based upon his knowledge of the situation, he will interview pilots and observers upon the completion of missions with the object of developing and transmitting all possible information.

(g) *Study of aerial photographs.*—The study of aerial photographs by qualified specialists frequently furnishes detailed information of the greatest value concerning the enemy's activities.

(h) *Study of hostile and neutral press.*—This study furnishes important information bearing on enemy resources, political conditions, and morale, as well as information concerning recruiting, troop movements, and other subjects, even though censorship may be applied.

(i) *Espionage.*—Secret agents sometimes procure accurate information of vital importance in the conduct of operations. However, information from this source will require the most careful analysis and evaluation to determine its reliability.

(2) *Troops.*—(a) It is the continuing duty of every combat unit to secure all possible information of the enemy and to report such information to higher and affected adjacent commands with the least possible delay. In the absence of positive information, negative information should be reported. In addition to this continuing duty, intelligence missions may be assigned to troop units, directing

them to gain certain definite information required by the commander.

(b) In addition to the collection of documents found on enemy dead and on prisoners, arrangements should be made for the collection of all printed matter or manuscripts found in places lately occupied by the enemy. Immediately following occupation of a town or village, steps should be taken to seize vacated enemy headquarters, post and telegraph offices, telephone exchanges, police stations, and government and municipal offices in order to prevent the destruction of valuable documents and records.

(c) Troop units maintain continuous observation over areas immediately to the front by means of ground observation and by aerial observation when aviation is available. Visual observation should be supplemented by aerial photographs when possible.

(d) It is frequently necessary to engage in combat for the specific purpose of obtaining information.

(3) *Special information services of component units of command.*—These services are in general technical and are frequently operated primarily in the interest of the arms to which they pertain. They are not under direct supervision of the intelligence section. However, closest cooperation and liaison are maintained between these agencies and the intelligence section which should be furnished with all information procured. These services include—

(a) *Field artillery intelligence section.*—Each echelon of command in the Field Artillery from the battalion up is provided with a staff section charged with intelligence matters and which operates in close coordination with all other similar sections. The general sources of information available to these sections are liaison sections with infantry battalions in contact; field artillery observation posts; balloons working with the artillery; observation aviation on field artillery missions; and observation battalions, sound and flash ranging.

(b) *Air Corps intelligence.*—In addition to normal intelligence activities, the Air Corps produces aerial photographs for intelligence and mapping purposes and prepares and disseminates meteorological data.

(c) *Antiaircraft intelligence service.*—The antiaircraft intelligence service employs observation and special instruments for the detection of aircraft.

(d) *Signal intelligence work.*—In the army and higher headquarters, the signal intelligence service includes telegraph and telephone listening stations, radio interception and goniometry, and laboratories for the solution of codes and ciphers and secret inks.

(e) *Engineer intelligence.*—In addition to normal intelligence activities, the engineers collect data for preparation or correction of maps and in stabilized situations operate a listening service for the detection of mining by the enemy.

(f) *Aircraft warning service.*

c. Higher and adjacent units frequently have means for collecting information not available in a particular unit. Close liaison should be established with these organizations for the purpose of obtaining all pertinent information.

d. The adaptation of new scientific developments to war is gradually making the task of G-2 more complex; at the same time, however, it affords him additional means for the collection of information. Every new invention that may possibly be used as an information gathering or transmitting device should be tested immediately for this purpose.

■ 15. INTELLIGENCE PLAN.—The essential elements of information having been announced, it is necessary that definite and precise instructions for obtaining the required information be given to the collecting agencies or that higher or adjacent headquarters be requested to furnish it. To avoid any possibility of omission or conflict, the intelligence officer must follow a logical, orderly mental process in analyzing and transforming the essential elements of information into missions, in allotting the missions to collecting agencies, and in designating the time when and the place where information is to be reported. The scope of the intelligence plan depends upon the sphere of action of the commander for whom it is drawn. It will be subsequently modified to conform to new decisions made by the commander during the development of the situation. A form for use and the steps necessary in the preparation of the intelligence plan are given below.

INTELLIGENCE (G-2) PLAN

| Phases or periods of the operation | Essential elements of information | Analysis of essential elements of information | Collecting agency or other source | Specific orders or requests | Hour and destination at which information is to be reported |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| | | | | | |

a. Phases or periods of the operation.—The plan should be devised for a specific phase of the operation or for a particular time interval. The period should not be so long as to require drastic changes in the essential elements of information before its termination, nor so short as to require frequent changes in missions.

b. Essential elements of information.—In this column are listed in brief form the essential elements of information to govern in the projected operations or situation.

c. Analysis of essential elements of information.—In this column, G-2 briefly records the results of his analysis of the essential elements of information, setting down items that would be needed to answer the questions asked or implied by the wording of the essential elements. Certain essential elements will require very little analysis by the intelligence officer in order to transform them into suitable reconnaissance missions. If the information to be obtained gives a direct answer to the inquiry contained in an essential element, analysis is unnecessary. Others, however, must be subjected to careful analysis in order to determine what indications must be sought to answer the inquiries contained therein. The object of this analysis is to break down the essential elements into indications of possible enemy action that will furnish the basis for definite reconnaissance missions.

d. Collecting agency or other source.—In this column, G-2 records the agency or agencies to be assigned the mission of collecting information bearing on the indications of enemy action. If the information is to be requested from higher or adjacent units, these sources are also listed. To

utilize properly the available collecting agencies in the search for information, it is essential that G-2 is thoroughly familiar with their powers and limitations and cooperates closely with G-3.

e. Specific orders or requests.—Having analyzed the essential elements and having recorded the general manifestations or indications corresponding to each plan open to the enemy, G-2 next sets down the specific orders for the collecting agencies and the requests to be made on higher or adjacent units. Each of these agencies is given specific and definite missions in accordance with its characteristics and limitations. It is frequently the case that several agencies may be utilized in establishing one definite fact bearing on an essential element.

f. Hour and destination at which information is to be reported.—From a knowledge of the plan of operations gained by close cooperation with G-3, G-2 determines when and where essential information must be reported in order to be of use to the commander. In determining the time at which information must be available, G-2 is guided by the fact that information arriving too late is of no value, and information arriving in advance of its actual need is likely to be inaccurate at the time when projected operations are undertaken.

■ 16. INSTRUCTIONS TO COLLECTING AGENCIES.—*a. General.*—When approved, the completed intelligence plan forms the basis for orders to all collecting agencies. These orders are either published to the collecting agencies in a field order, in the intelligence annex to a field order, or in fragmentary orders. When combat units are required to execute tactical operations in order to obtain information, their tactical missions only and not details of the information required will be covered by paragraph 3 of the field order.

b. Intelligence annex.—(1) The intelligence annex may be issued by a division or higher unit when it can be distributed in time to be of use. In it the instructions to each collecting agency are placed together in one paragraph. Even though an annex is to be issued, missions of immediate importance should be given in fragmentary orders to the units concerned and later repeated in the annex, if they have not become obsolete by the time it is published.

(2) A form for the intelligence annex is prescribed in FM 101-5.

SECTION IV

COLLATION OF INFORMATION

■ 17. PURPOSE.—The purpose of collation is the arrangement of information in a systematic manner so as to facilitate its use by G-2. The process involves the sorting and grouping of information by classification so that items of the same type may be kept together for convenience of comparison and study.

■ 18. METHOD OF RECORDING.—*a.* In matters relative to the recording of information, this manual will be considered only as a guide. *The intelligence officer of every unit must adapt procedure to the needs of his unit and arm or service. Simplification of method will be especially necessary in the small units of the more mobile arms.* Under no circumstances should a G-2 allow himself to be engulfed in a mass of paper work when the situation is moving so rapidly as to prevent the maintenance of all records suggested to the exclusion of the real mission of assembling and interpreting information and disseminating military intelligence.

b. After the initial examination, each item of information should be recorded in such a manner as to be convenient for reference and study. Each item is recorded in one or more ways; in the G-2 journal, the G-2 work sheet, upon the G-2 situation map, or in the documents pertaining to battle order. Sometimes a single item will be recorded in all four. By these means, a systematic running account is kept of all information received at headquarters and the intelligence officer is enabled conveniently to analyze and evaluate the information and later to classify and prepare it for use and for dissemination as military intelligence. The journal, work sheet, and situation map are necessary in the preparation of G-2 reports and serve as a convenient means of reference for the commander and for members of his staff.

■ 19. G-2 JOURNAL.—*a.* The G-2 journal is the daybook of the intelligence office. It is kept by the G-2 office of each

combat unit down to include the corps. In divisions, when G-2 office personnel is small in number, and in brigades and lower units, the G-2 journal may be combined with those of the other staff sections. It contains briefs of important written and oral messages received and sent, as well as notations of periodic reports, orders, and similar matters that pertain directly to the military intelligence section. If the item is received or issued in oral form, the entry in the journal is detailed; if it is in documentary form, the entry may consist of a reference and a brief synopsis of the contents.

b. The journal is kept as a permanent record and should be looked upon as the main and primary record of the operations of the intelligence section of the staff. For this reason, entries in the journal are made immediately upon receipt of the report of the event. The original entry should not be altered, but may be supplemented by subsequent entries.

c. The journal is either closed daily or at the end of a phase or period. One copy of it is turned over to the chief of staff for consolidation with the other journals of the headquarters. The journal is supported by a file of original orders, reports, special reports, studies, and maps pertinent to the operations of the military intelligence section.

d. The form of the journal is prescribed in FM 101-5.

■ 20. G-2 WORK SHEET.—a. The purpose of the work sheet is to facilitate systematic arrangement of information coming into the intelligence office, so that all items bearing on a particular subject will be grouped together for ready reference and comparison. In this respect, the work sheet differs from the G-2 journal in which the information is entered chronologically. A secondary purpose of the work sheet is to facilitate preparation of the G-2 report. For this reason, the G-2 work sheet has the same paragraphing as the G-2 report, suitable space being left under each heading for the entry of pertinent information.

b. The work sheet is merely a convenient memorandum pad for the G-2 officer and is not a permanent document. It should always be up to date, obsolete items being either lined out or withdrawn.

■ 21. G-2 SITUATION MAP.—*a.* The G-2 situation map is kept by G-2 of each combat unit. Upon it is recorded graphically all available information of the enemy in a convenient form for ready reference and study. The situation map supplements but cannot take the place of the work sheet.

b. The map used for this purpose should be the best available. Its proper scale will depend on the size of the unit; the smaller the unit the larger should be the scale of the map. However, higher headquarters should have on hand copies of all maps used by subordinate units down to the smallest, so that there will be no danger of having reports or messages refer to places not shown on the maps available at headquarters.

c. The terrain covered should include that in possession of our own troops as well as that held by the enemy. Information of the enemy that is of importance to the particular unit is placed on the situation map by means of conventional signs or symbols, care being taken to prevent it from becoming too cluttered up. This information will vary with the size of the unit; the smaller the unit, the more detailed the information recorded.

d. It is often necessary or advisable to show on the situation map certain of our own dispositions in order that the hostile situation may be more readily understood. The information necessary to keep up this side of the map is obtained from G-3 and all information in regard to enemy dispositions should be promptly furnished to G-3 for inclusion on the G-3 operations map.

e. The situation map is kept constantly up to date, new sheets being used when necessary. A tracing or a copy of this map, showing the situation as known at the close of the period, should accompany the intelligence report.

f. In brigades and lower units, it is not advisable for each staff section to keep a separate situation map but the data from each section are ordinarily entered on one map which is kept under supervision of the executive officer. In divisions, when personnel of the various sections is small in number, joint G-2—G-3 and G-1—G-4 situation maps may be kept.

■ 22. OBSERVER'S REPORT.—The observer's report is an intelligence document in which is reported enemy information for

a given period or mission. Forms for observers' reports are given in FM 30-10 and in Field Manuals for the arms.

■ 23. G-2 FILES.—*a.* Copies of the messages sent and received are carefully preserved, as they support entries in the journal, work sheet, situation map, documents pertaining to battle order, and the G-2 report.

b. A suitably indexed file is kept of all information that may be of future value. For example, during a period of stabilization, much information will be collected which is of no immediate interest but which may become invaluable in case an attack is ordered. This will cover such subjects as the hostile defenses, condition of roads, railways, and bridges within the hostile lines, location and contents of supply establishments, location of hostile reserves, and many other items. If published in periodic reports as it comes in, it will be disregarded and forgotten by most of the recipients and will not be available when needed. A preferable way is to place it in a file where it will be available for immediate check against new information. When an operation is planned in which the information will be needed, G-2 should issue a situation map and a study or special report embodying all available information. Such data may include shelled areas, gassed areas, sensitive points, movements, supply establishments, artillery locations, and progress of enemy works.

c. The proper tabulation or recording of information relative to enemy manpower and military organizations is highly important if such data are to be properly evaluated and interpreted. The development of suitable forms for the purpose is a responsibility of G-2, GHQ. Data pertaining to enemy organizations should be filed by divisions and by suborganizations within the division. This will facilitate the preparation of divisional histories and the transfer of records in event divisions are broken up.

d. Information pertaining to filing of aerial photographs is covered in FM 30-21.

e. Personal collections of documents are strictly forbidden. Every item of information regardless of its source or content is official and must be promptly recorded and filed in the prescribed manner.

SECTION V

EVALUATION AND INTERPRETATION OF INFORMATION

■ 24. PURPOSE.—*a.* The purpose of critical and systematic analysis of enemy information is to determine its probable accuracy, significance, and importance. Information subjected to this process becomes military intelligence.

b. G-2 should not merely transmit information but should analyze, evaluate, and interpret enemy information and transmit the resulting military intelligence to all concerned. Military intelligence must be concise, free from irrelevant matter, and ready for immediate use; at the same time it must be so complete as to convey not only facts but also their significance, as well as all deductions to be drawn from a consideration of them in connection with other intelligence already at hand.

■ 25. EVALUATION.—Upon receipt at the G-2 office, all information should be subjected to the following analysis to determine its probable intelligence value:

a. Initial examination.—Immediately upon its receipt in the G-2 office, each item of information should be subjected to a preliminary examination to determine whether or not it has intelligence value. This involves a consideration of the following points.

(1) Is it information of the enemy or of terrain not under our control?

(2) Is it information needed immediately, and if so, by whom?

(3) Is it information of future value?

(4) Is it information of value to this unit or to higher, subordinate, or neighboring units?

b. Credibility of source.—Credibility of the source or agency reporting information must be determined. The following are some of the important points to receive attention:

(1) Judging from previous experience, is the source of information accurate and reliable?

(2) Under conditions existing at the time, that is, distance, means employed, visibility, etc., could the information have been obtained?

c. Accuracy.—Accuracy of the information must be determined. This is facilitated by a consideration of the following points:

(1) Is it confirmed or corroborated by other information previously received?

(2) In what respects does it agree or disagree with available information covering the same point, particularly that known to be correct?

(3) If it is at variance with information previously received and the different items cannot be reconciled, which is more likely to be correct?

■ 26. INTERPRETATION.—*a.* The accuracy and credibility of information having been determined by comparing it with information previously received, the intelligence officer's next step is to interpret it in the light of its probable significance. The following are some of the important questions that should be considered:

(1) What does it mean in connection with what is already known?

(2) Does it alter or add significance to information previously received?

(3) Does it tend to confirm the estimate as to the enemy situation or does it indicate that the estimate is incorrect?

b. Up to this point in the intelligence officer's reasoning, his deductions have been concerned only with the facts of the enemy situation. The whole process has been an effort to establish accurately the facts. Based on the situation, conclusions as to the enemy capabilities should be reached later.

■ 27. ANSWER TO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.—*a.* Essential elements of information relating to the terrain may be answered as soon as sufficient credible information is available upon which to base a conclusion.

b. Essential elements of enemy information may be answered only after careful check of evaluated information against all possible lines of action open to the enemy. The intelligence officer endeavors to verify or disprove each hypothesis relative to possible lines of action open to the enemy. To do this, he obtains all the facts possible concerning the enemy situation; facts bearing on each hypothesis. Then, in the light of these ascertained facts, he considers whether the

enemy is still capable of acting in accordance with a certain hypothesis. By eliminating as many of these hypotheses as possible, he narrows down the lines of action which were originally open to the enemy to those which are still open to him. Unless the enemy has so committed himself as to be physically capable of only one line of action affecting our mission, any attempted deduction as to his probable intentions is a guess, which, if not rejected by the commander, is likely to prove positively misleading and to result in faulty decisions. Commanders should not expect or require their intelligence officers to attempt such deductions. Even captured enemy orders may prove misleading, as the hostile commander may revoke them and adopt a new line of action, or they may have been prepared with the intention of having them captured as a means of deception. It may be useful for G-2 to express a conclusion that present enemy dispositions favor a certain hostile line of action, but as long as more than one line remains open, the commander must base his own estimate of the situation on all possible lines of action. If in an extreme case, a commander cannot guard against all enemy capabilities, a properly framed G-2 estimate will enable him to take a calculated risk.

■ 28. CONCLUSIONS.—a. The study of all available information should enable G-2 to—

(1) Determine the enemy capabilities or the lines of action open to the enemy that would have a bearing on the accomplishment of the commander's mission.

(2) Determine the conditions under which any particular capability may be carried out; for example, the time, place, and strength of an attack.

(3) Draw conclusions in certain cases as to the relative probability of adoption of lines of action open to the enemy.

b. The factual information collected, collated, and interpreted by G-2 should permit the commander to plan his operation, taking into account the lines of action open to the enemy. Additional information acquired during the progress of operations should enable G-2 progressively to narrow down the lines of action open to the enemy in time to prevent a surprise.

SECTION VI

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

■ 29. G-2 ESTIMATE.—*a.* A G-2 estimate of the enemy situation will be furnished the commander by G-2, either upon his own initiative when warranted by the developments in the situation or when required by the commander. The estimate may be in writing but is ordinarily presented orally. It will summarize the enemy situation and possible plans. Usually G-2 will be able to anticipate the necessity for such an estimate; but in any case, he must be prepared to furnish it to his commander when required.

b. A form for a G-2 estimate of the enemy situation is as follows:

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

Title

Place

Date and hour

1. Summary of the enemy situation.¹

a. Enemy activities in forward areas and new identifications.

b. Movements, concentrations, and establishments in rear areas.

c. Terrain and weather as they affect the enemy.

2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy capabilities.—An enumeration of lines of action open to the enemy which may affect accomplishment of the mission of the command.

b. (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the foregoing lines of action when such statement can be justified.

(2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.²

(Signature of chief of section)

¹ Omit subheadings when these are not applicable.

² This justification usually must consist of definite information of enemy dispositions which favor one or more capabilities and militate against others. Under exceptional circumstances, even

SECTION VII

DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

■ 30. NECESSITY.—Military intelligence is of no use unless it reaches the individuals or units concerned in time to serve their purposes. It is therefore of the utmost importance that it be properly and quickly disseminated in accordance with its urgency.

■ 31. METHODS.—*a. Personal contact.*—It is frequently possible for G-2 or his assistants to transmit, either in person or by telephone, items of information of immediate value to those concerned.

b. Special messages.—When it is impossible for G-2 to transmit important information either in person or by telephone, special messages may be transmitted by airplane, motorcycle messenger, or other rapid means of communication.

c. Conferences.—The exchange of information between the various military intelligence sections of higher, lower, and adjacent units is facilitated by frequent personal conferences between the staff officers concerned. In no other way can a community of thought and adjustment of viewpoints be so quickly and effectively realized.

d. Periodic G-2 report.—(1) The periodic G-2 report is an intelligence document that sums up information which has been collected, evaluated, and interpreted during a given period. It is issued by all military intelligence sections of combat units from the army to the division, inclusive, and is usually supplemented by a situation map or overlay. Brigades and lower units ordinarily submit one staff or unit report which includes appropriate paragraphs relative to intelligence. The period of time to be covered by this report

though the enemy dispositions may not favor any particular capability, a thorough knowledge of the enemy's tactical doctrine, recent performances, national psychology, and the character and mentality of the hostile commander may justify an indication of priority. The basis for indicating a priority must be clearly stated. When the enemy dispositions do not favor any capability, the mere fact that G-2 thinks he would adopt a certain line of action if he were in the place of the enemy, or that the terrain favors a certain capability, is insufficient justification.

is prescribed by higher headquarters or by the unit commander in the absence of such instructions. In active operations it usually covers a 24-hour period. It is a convenient means for keeping higher, lower, and adjacent units informed of the enemy situation as determined by the unit preparing the report. It frequently contains important information which has already been disseminated by means of special messages.

(2) Each commander is most interested in hostile units of the same size as his own. The subordinate units should be able to obtain from the periodic G-2 report and the situation map the facts concerning the enemy situation so far as they have been determined at the time of the report. In the smaller units, such as the battalion and regiment, the report will go into considerable detail and consider the very smallest hostile unit. Going up the scale of command, the reports become a little less detailed and treat the information from a broader viewpoint.

(3) The periodic G-2 report will usually be of considerable interest to higher authority, although the information contained therein frequently will be known prior to its arrival. Periodic reports will contain details which may be essential to certain studies, and also information which, even though not demanding immediate exploitation, is nevertheless of considerable importance to higher authority; for example, data on hostile tactical methods.

(4) G-2 reports and situation maps are intended primarily for use during contact with the enemy. They also serve a purpose for units not engaged, for they permit all commanders to keep in touch with the general situation of the enemy and with the local situation at points where the unit is likely to be engaged.

(5) The form for the G-2 report is prescribed in FM 101-5.

e. Special reports.—Although higher echelons will receive copies of the periodic G-2 reports of the next lower unit, these periodic reports, as has been indicated, are more or less complete documents with rather wide distribution. Their preparation, reproduction, and transmission will require much more time than would a brief message capable

of being transmitted by telephone. Consequently, higher echelons, in addition to receiving periodic reports, will usually require special reports from lower units summarizing the situation and enemy capabilities. These reports lack the mass of detail normally contained in a periodic report, but present the general picture to higher authority and in particular contain such information as would be of interest to the latter. They should be prepared in written form by G-2 and approved by the commander or chief of staff. They may take the form suggested in paragraph 29 for the G-2 estimate of the situation.

f. Divisional histories.—Based upon the study of the enemy order of battle, the intelligence section of GHQ may prepare and issue to divisions and higher units concise histories of enemy divisions. If issued, these documents will ordinarily include information on composition, strength, morale, tactics, armament, previous service, and an estimate of the combat worth of each enemy division. Information of qualifications and character of the principal enemy commanders should also be included.

SECTION VIII

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

■ 32. BASIC PRINCIPLE.—Military intelligence training in all echelons of command will include instructions in the collection, recording, evaluation, and interpretation of information of the enemy and the terrain, in dissemination of military intelligence, in various means of concealing information of our own capabilities or intentions, and in measures to be taken to prevent the enemy from influencing our actions by means of propaganda.

■ 33. RESPONSIBILITY.—*a. The commander.*—The commanding officer is responsible for intelligence training within his command, and that all officers and enlisted men have an understanding of their military intelligence duties. In battalions and higher organizations, he is assisted in carrying out this responsibility by an assistant chief of staff, G-2.

b. The assistant chief of staff, G-2.—The assistant chief of staff, G-2, is directly responsible for the training of his intelligence section and when directed by the commanding officer, for the supervision of the training of intelligence sections of all subordinate echelons of command. He collaborates with the assistant chief of staff, G-3, in preparation of training programs and makes recommendations regarding intelligence matters for inclusion therein.

■ 34. APPLICATION.—*a.* Training in military intelligence will not be restricted to personnel assigned to the military intelligence sections of various headquarters. Appropriate instruction in this subject will be given to all officers and enlisted men because every officer and enlisted man has a part to play in military intelligence. Personnel assigned to intelligence duties at the various headquarters will be given additional and more thorough instruction appropriate to its assignment. This section deals more in detail with the training of this personnel in the Infantry. With appropriate modifications and additions, it is applicable to all arms and services.

b. Some of the arms and services are charged with activities of immediate importance in military intelligence. These arms and services are responsible for preparation of detailed training programs and instruction of specialists for performance of these duties.

■ 35. QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL.—Only officers and enlisted men who have a good general military background should be considered for specialized intelligence training. If it is impossible to secure this type of personnel, officers and men will be selected for intelligence duty only after they have completed a course in basic military instruction.

a. Officers.—The assistant chief of staff, G-2, should be thoroughly instructed and trained in the organization, tactics, and logistics of the unit to which he pertains. He is in effect the specialist in the enemy's operations at our headquarters, and he should be the best qualified officer available. An understanding of the enemy's organization, tactical methods, methods of supply, national psychology and

language, and a thorough grounding in all military intelligence matters will complete his professional equipment.

b. Enlisted men.—Enlisted men selected for intelligence duty should be of excellent physique, good judgment, observant mind, and possess initiative, imagination, zeal, energy, and a keen sense of responsibility. They should have the equivalent of a high-school education, and should be capable of expressing themselves clearly and of writing a legible hand. In addition to these personal qualifications, they should be trained soldiers before their special intelligence training is begun.

■ 36. METHOD.—*a.* Specialized intelligence training is best accomplished by centralized instruction. The basic training unit is the regiment, which should include an intelligence school in its program of instruction. This school should be conducted by the regimental intelligence officer. The regularly assigned intelligence personnel and selected men detailed from battalions and companies will undergo the course of instruction.

b. The course should contain both theoretical and practical instruction. Tests for proficiency should include a practical demonstration of ability to perform the various duties of the intelligence section.

■ 37. REGIMENTAL COURSE OF INSTRUCTION.—*a.* The detailed training program in the regimental intelligence school will include the following subjects:

Military organization.

Object, organization, and description of the intelligence organization from battalion to division, inclusive.

Collection, recording, evaluation, and interpretation of information.

Dissemination of military intelligence.

Theory and practice of observation, including recognition and appreciation of what is of military value; rendering of accurate, clear, concise, and relevant reports; orientation of the map on the terrain and ready identification of visible terrain features; and establishment and operation of observation posts.

Installation and operation of field telephones.

Use of the compass, field glasses, and simple stereoscope.

Conventional signs, military symbols, and abbreviations.

Map and aerial photograph reading.

Sketching.

Examination and filing of aerial photographs.

Allowance, requisition, distribution, use, and care of maps.

Keeping the situation map and the preparation of overlays.

Verbal and written reports and messages.

Examination of enemy personnel, repatriates, captured documents, and matériel.

Identification of the enemy's uniform, distinctive markings and habits.

Counterintelligence measures, including secrecy discipline; preparation and use of documents; signal communication security; movements of troops and individuals; censorship; and counterpropaganda.

Identification of aircraft.

Scouting and patrolling dismounted.

Visual signaling.

Cross-country movements by day and by night.

Camouflage, camouflage discipline, and the art of concealment.

Means of communication.

Appearance and forms of activity of different arms of the service.

Elementary tactical instruction.

b. Training should not end with completion of the regimental intelligence school, but should be continued and perfected by repetition. In active operations, rest periods should be utilized to correct deficiencies, improve efficiency of the intelligence section, and complete the training of replacements.

■ 38. DIVISIONAL COURSE OF INSTRUCTION.—When the division is assembled as a unit or its various elements are in close proximity to each other, a divisional school should be estab-

lished under direct supervision of the assistant chief of staff, G-2. This course should precede the regimental course and should include instruction for all officers and senior noncommissioned officers of the division assigned to intelligence duties on the following subjects:

Organization and duties of the intelligence sections, from battalion to GHQ, inclusive.

Organization and operation of the regimental and divisional intelligence office.

Maintenance and use of the regimental and divisional intelligence records.

Ground reconnaissance and observation.

Artillery intelligence sections.

Signal intelligence.

Examination of enemy personnel, repatriates, documents, and matériel at the various echelons of command.

Enemy order of battle.

Topographic engineers, including requisition and issue of maps within the division.

Aerial reconnaissance, including visual observation and aerial photography (flights to be made by the officers).

Coordination of aerial photography and tactical interpretation of aerial photographs.

Terrain studies intended to familiarize the student with effect of terrain upon operations, military resources of the theater of operations, engineer information to be gained from a knowledge or view of the country, and use of foreign maps.

Meteorological information and influence of weather conditions upon operations.

Use of ground and cover.

Counterintelligence measures within the division.

Camouflage, camouflage discipline, and the art of concealment and deception.

Identification of aircraft.

Publicity and propaganda.

Tactics and characteristics of weapons of the various arms.

Lectures on appropriate foreign armies and countries, with the object of developing points of strength and weakness of each.

■ 39. MANEUVERS.—Practical training in military intelligence prior to actual operations is extremely difficult. If any degree of proficiency is to be maintained, it is imperative that careful consideration is given the subject in the preparation and execution of maneuvers, particularly two-sided maneuvers. Intelligence measures that may be actively employed include visual and photographic aerial reconnaissance; ground reconnaissance by combat elements; ground observation; signal intelligence, including surveillance of our own communication, and the interception of communication of the opposing side; supervision in all units of security arrangements for the safeguarding of military information; use of camouflage and camouflage discipline; restrictions on use of lights; identification of aircraft; preparation and distribution of aerial photographs as supplements to maps; policies regarding maps to be used and map allowances; requisition and distribution of maps; reception and supervision of visitors; and publicity. The last two measures should, under no circumstances, be allowed to divert the attention of the assistant chief of staff, G-2, from other and more important duties.

■ 40. GHQ INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL.—Success of the intelligence service as a whole will depend in large measure upon selection of suitable personnel and their proper training. The GHQ or theater commander may establish an intelligence school for instruction of selected personnel. Officers detailed to this school who fail to measure up to the highest standards should be promptly relieved. The school should include practical instruction in various military intelligence activities and detailed instruction on the enemy country and army.

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